Disproving Anselm

Note: the following is an analysis of one of the most convoluted philosophical propositions of all time. I have untangled it considerably (after reading the relevant chapters, sited and not sited, some commentaries and expansions five times or more), I have discarded the extraneous bits and the patently nonsensical, and I have left the and most subtle form of it for a separate article, never the less, if I were you I would just skip to the part that reads “QED.” and take my word for it.

Anselm’s ontological argument is wrong.

The ontological argument in St. Anselm’s formulation defines God as “a being than which none greater can be thought”—or the greatest being conceivable. He goes on saying,

Don’t bother rereading that, allow me to translate. He is saying that God is the greatest being conceivable, a being that is thought of as existing in reality is greater than a being which is thought of as existing in the understanding alone, therefore God is thought of as existing in reality. You will notice that I have taken some pain to keep Anselm’s original wording, but Anselm takes the phrase “thought of as existing” to be synonymous with actually existing; I think that my formulation makes the difference explicit.

It is possible to think of something as existing that actually does not exist—apart from God, Anselm would also have believed in a flat Earth, for example. When we think of a being, any property we give to it in thought is hypothetical, Anselm fails to make the leap from a conceived, or hypothetical existence, to an actual one.

But it is a strange argument to suggest that existence alone makes something greater than something which is only conceived of; is a conceivable disease inferior to an actual disease? Or even more absurd, is an actual insect superior to a conceivable super-hero? The comparison is pointless. Working under this strange logic, we may say that of all the beings that actually exist, the greatest one is God. But this tells us nothing about the nature of such a being; for all you know I am the greatest being that actually exists, yet I haven’t inspired religious feelings in more than a dozen or so people.

Anselm goes on. In Chapter 3 he writes:

“…something can be thought of as existing which cannot be thought of as not existing, and this is greater than that which can be thought of as not existing.”

Since God is defined by the ontological argument as “a being greater than which cannot be conceived”, if we can think of something whose nonexistence is unthinkable, God must have this property. Even in his day people pointed out to Anselm that it actually is possible to think of God as nonexistent, to which he gave the clever reply that, since God’s nonexistence cannot even be thought of, if you think of ‘God’ as nonexistent, you must not be thinking of God. You can imagine how this rather pulls the rug out from under the debate.

But his claim that something can be thought of which cannot be thought of as nonexistent seems precarious to me. Certainly, since we can put the claim into words we can think of the property (or if you like, the predicate) of ‘unthinkable nonexistence’, but who understands the claim that an actual being possessed of this property can be conceived of? To what degree can we really think of this being, if we do not understand it, do not understand why or how its nonexistence is unthinkable? Surely to think of a property is not the same as thinking of a being to which this property may sensibly be applied. After all, I can think of the property of something being a square circle, but I cannot actually conceive of the object which might actually be a square circle (in point of fact, it is impossible).

Anselm’s logic here actually eats the ontological argument. What he is saying is that there could conceivably be a being whose nonexistence is unthinkable, that anyone who thinks this being does not exist, is not actually thinking of this being (I make the point that this is because it is impossible to think of this being, just as it is impossible to think of an object that is simultaneously a square and a circle). But, if he is saying that some people give this being no thought, this is different from saying that everyone thinks this being exists. But if conceiving of a property is the same as conceiving of the being possessed of the property, well then, we can conceive of a being whom everyone must think exists, this being would be greater than a being only possessing the property of unthinkable nonexistence. But this much is plain: not everybody thinks that any such being exists! Is that not tantamount to saying that the being “greater than which cannot be conceived” does not exist in reality? (Because it ought to have the conceivable property that everyone thinks it exists.)

As much as I hate to admit it, however, this isn’t a QED that God does not exist, it only demonstrates that Anselm’s formulation of the ontological argument is false.

QED.